task (r = -0.39, 95% CI = -0.68/-0.13). Computational modelling of the behavioural 48 data unmasks a learning deficit in high AQ scorers, namely the failure to integrate 49 social context to adapt one's belief precision -the precision afforded to prior beliefs 50 about changing states in the world -particularly in relation to the non-social cue. 51
Conclusions: More pronounced autistic traits in a group of healthy controls are 52 related to lower scores associated with misintegration of the social cue. 53
Computational modeling further demonstrates that these trait-related performance 54 differences are not explained by an inability to process the social stimuli and their 55 causes, but rather by the extent to which participants consider social information to 56 infer on the non-social cue. Autism is characterized by profound impairments of social interaction and 61 communication. These difficulties are thought to be related across the diagnostic 62 divide to autistic trait-associated differences in social perceptual and/or cognitive 63 abilities (1) . In recent years it has become clear that a striking dissociation exists 64 between relatively intact explicit and severely impaired implicit social abilities (2) . In 65 other words, high-functioning individuals with autism learn to explicitly think about 66 other persons' mental states and may tend to do so even more often than neurotypical 67
adults, yet they still find it very difficult to engage in real-time social interactions with 68 non-autistic persons (3, 4) . Interestingly, exactly which subpersonal processes show 69 autism trait-related differences and could explain everyday life social impairments is 70 still a matter of substantial controversy. Recent studies have provided evidence that 71 many putatively relevant processes such as action perception are intact in autism (5) . 72
Still, individuals with autism suffer from striking impairments in everyday life social 73 situations, which begs the question which and how processes other than basic 74 perceptual mechanisms may come into play (6). 75 76 A currently prominent theoretical suggestion includes the assumption that the autistic 77 spectrum might be specifically characterized by deficits of predictive coding or 78
Bayesian inference (7, 8) . Predictive coding formulations of perception propose that 79 expectations in higher brain areas generate top-down predictions that meet bottom-up 80 stimulus-related signals from lower sensory areas. The discrepancy between actual 81 sensory input and predictions of that input is described as a prediction error (PE). The degree to which PEs revise (Bayesian) beliefs depends upon the precision afforded to 83
PEs. In other words, the precision of sensory PEs -relative to the precision of prior 84 beliefs (and their PEs) -can have a profound effect on belief updating. In regards to 85 autism, it has been proposed that autistic traits might be related to higher sensory 86 precision, i.e. a stronger reliance on (bottom-up) sensory evidence as compared to 87 (top-down) prior beliefs, which can lead to a failure of automatically contextualizing 88 sensory information in an optimal and socially adequate fashion (9, 10). Furthermore, 89 the reliance on prior beliefs might be particularly important and relevant in situations 90 of high uncertainty such as direct social interactions with others as social agents are 91
arguably the most difficult stimuli to predict (10). Interestingly, this theoretical 92 proposition resonates with clinical descriptions of patients with autism as having a 93 particular dislike for situations of direct social interaction with others whereas 94 situations of social observation (when other agents are merely observed) are described 95 as less difficult (4) . 96
97
In light of recent findings, which demonstrate relatively intact perceptual processes 98 across a wide range of tasks in autism, it might be exactly the integration of bottom-99 up and top-down processes during social interactions and exploitation of social cues 100 provided by others during decision-making that could be particularly relevant to 101 understanding the social impairments in autism. In other words, while autistic traits 102 may not be associated with disturbances of basic perceptual and learning processes, it 103
is conceivable that such traits may affect social learning processes or the extent to 104 which social information automatically influences decision-making and thereby what 105 behavior is actually shown. From a predictive coding perspective, there are two possible pathologies. First, there could be deficits in predicting and inferring the 107 mental states of others due to an impoverished weight or precision of higher-level 108 prior beliefs or, secondly, these inference or representations are unable to influence 109 behavior. 110 111 Importantly, recent progress in computational modeling has convincingly 112 demonstrated that Bayesian models can be used to formally investigate perceptual and 113 cognitive mechanisms that underlie social behavior when explicit social advice is 114 provided to study participants (11): In particular, it has been shown that humans 115 employ hierarchical generative models to make inferences about the changing 116 intentions of others when attention is explicitly directed towards them and that they 117 integrate estimates of advice accuracy (i.e. the correctness of the advice, which can be 118 valid or misleading depending on the conflicting interests of the players) with non-119 social sources of information when making decisions. In Bayesian terms, this 120 integration corresponds to an optimal weighting of pro-social and non -social cues in 121 terms of their relative precision, when making decisions. 122
123
In our study, we build upon this research by applying hierarchical Bayesian modeling 124 to behavioral data from a novel version of a probabilistic learning paradigm that 125 included a social gaze cue about whose relevance no explicit information was to 126 investigate autistic trait-related differences in the extent to which healthy individuals 127 integrate and use this piece of social information during task performance. In light of 128 the evidence discussed above, we hypothesized that autistic traits are related to 129 differences in the extent to which individuals are influenced by social cues (i.e., their precision), rather than a general inability to process social cues and putatively 131 underlying mental states. On the behavioral level, this should result in higher total 132 task scores for individuals lower in autistic traits as they should be more easily able to 133 exploit the additional social information. In terms of the underlying cognitive 134 processes, we hypothesized that this behavioral advantage might be subserved by 135 differences in the effect that social information can have on learning and decision-136 making, which, in turn, would be inversely related to autistic traits. We further 137 predicted that using the social cue should be more difficult under volatile conditions 138 and differentially so for individuals with higher autistic traits. 139 140 141
METHODS and MATERIALS 142 143
Participants 144
In light of evidence which suggests that autistic traits are distributed as a continuum 145 across the general population and are known to show identical aetiology across the 146 diagnostic divide (1), we chose to study healthy participants based on their score on 147 the German translation of Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire (12). This 148 experimental approach of studying autistic traits in neurotypicals makes it possible to 149 infer about the aetiology of autistic traits without potential confounds from a variety 150 of co-morbid conditions often noted in patients with autistic spectrum disorders. In 151 order to capture the extremes of the distribution and have a balanced proportion of 152 participants with high and low AQ scores, 36 subjects were pre-screened and invited based on their AQ scores up to 25 (19 males; aged 20 to 37 years; mean age = 26.25 154 years). It has been shown that AQ has a good discriminative validity at a threshold of 155 26 (13). Participants did not have any history of neurological and psychiatric 156 disorders and were invited by using preexisting database of the MPI for Metabolic 157
Research comprising healthy native German volunteers. The distribution of AQ 158 scores were as follows: range = 7 -23, mean = 15.72, SD = 5.09. All participants 159 gave informed consent before the beginning of the experiment. 160 161
Experimental Paradigm 162
The card game used in our study, which had been originally designed as two cards 163 with associated winning probabilities (14, 15), was combined with a face cue 164 presented in the center of the screen (Fig. 1A) . The eye gaze direction of the face was 165 manipulated to change during each trial and to then be directed towards one of the 166 cards, before participants were allowed to make their choice. As a result, there were 167 two things that need to be learned in the task. First, whether the reward is associated 168 with the green card or the blue card. Second, whether the gaze shift is directed 169 towards the card that is rewarded. The probability of whether or not the face actually 170 looked towards the winning card on a given trial (i.e. gaze accuracy) was 171 systematically manipulated in accordance with two probabilistic schedules (see SI for 172 more details about the schedules). 173
Across both conditions, the card and gaze accuracies were varied independently of 174 one another across the experiment ( Fig. 1B-C) . The phases in which the trials have 175 cues with unstable accuracy are referred as volatile phases. In the first half of the 176 experiment (trials 1 to 60), card accuracy was stable and high, whereas in the second half (trials 60 to 120) it followed a volatile phase ( Figure 1B ). For the gaze accuracy, 178 the volatile phase took place during trials 30 to 70. Positions of the cards (left or right) 179 were determined randomly. 180 Importantly, we manipulated the degree to which the gaze could influence learning 181 about the card probabilities. Although the gaze schedules were matched in terms of 182 overall congruency to the card probabilities, the order of those phases was 183 manipulated resulting in two different conditions: the congruency first condition 184 began with the gaze as highly congruent to the winning card (with 80% probability of 185 being informative of the winning card) and the incongruency first condition began 186 with the gaze strongly incongruent to the winning card (with only 20% probability of 187 being informative of the winning card) ( Figure 1C ). 188
189
In the instructions, subjects were informed that the cards have winning probabilities, 190 which can change during the experiment and which are independent of the reward 191 magnitude that is displayed on them. On each trial, there was only one correct card 192 and if they chose the correct card they would receive the score (random numbers 193 between 1 to 9) that had been displayed on it. They were instructed that they would 194 earn an extra amount of money depending on their score at the end of the experiment. 195
Finally, participants were informed about the presence of a face on the screen, which 196 was explained by stating that it was supposed to make the visual display "more 197 Belief Precision: In the HGF, the belief update is proportional to a precision-weighted 225
PE (see Supplementary material). The belief precision weighting the PE depends on 226
the estimated environmental volatility and the low-level (sensory) precision: 227
with the precision of the prediction given by: 228
where the ߤ ଷ (௧ିଵ) is the predicted environmental volatility. 230
Precision Weighted Response Model: We applied this model to derive subject-specific 231 accuracy and volatility estimates for card and gaze in a parallel manner. On a given 232 trial t, subjects generated a combined belief ܾ (௧) after weighting the posterior 233 expectation of inferred card and gaze accuracies, ߤ ଵ, (௧) and ߤ̂ଵ , (௧) to generate actions in 234 the following manner: 235
where ‫ݓ‬ (௧) and ‫ݓ‬ (௧) are effective precision ratios of gaze and card cues, ߤ ଵ, (௧) is the 239 transformed expected card colour probability from the perspective of the gaze (i.e., the estimated card colour probability indicated by the gaze), and ߤ̂ଵ , (௧) corresponds to 241 the logistic sigmoid of the current expectation of advisor fidelity: 242
Response model parameter ߞ is the weight on the precision of inferred gaze accuracy 244 or the additional bias towards the social cue; ߨ ො ଵ, (௧) and ߨ ො ଵ, (௧) are precisions (inverse 245 variances) at the first level for gaze and card accuracies, respectively. Since the first 246 level estimates are assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution, one can calculate the 247 precision at each trial by: 248
, ߨ ො ଵ,
The probability of taking the gaze advice was assumed to be a softmax function: 250
where ߚ > 0 is the subject-specific inverse decision temperature parameter. 252
Hypotheses: Given that we assumed the autistic spectrum to be characterized by 253 differences in the sensory precision compared to the belief (i.e. prior) precision, we 254 expected differences in two sets of parameters: (i) Perceptual model parameter the ߢ, 255 which modulates the influence of the sensory compared to the belief precision in the 256 belief updating process and (ii) response model parameter ߞ, which signals the bias 257 towards the social cue. To this hypothesis, we extracted the parameters of the winning 258 model, and subjected them to a two-way ANOVA with an interaction term (group, condition (congruent first versus incongruent first gaze schedule), and group × 260 condition). The participant groups were defined by their AQ scores, which were 261 obtained using a median split procedure (median AQ = 15). The models and the 262 routines for all analyses performed here are available as Matlab code: 263 https://gitlab.ethz.ch/dandreea/mltm. Please refer to Table 2 for the priors over the 264
parameters. 265
Other Behavioral Measures: We assessed the relationship between AQ scores and 266 total task scores as the ability to exploit the additional social information should 267 contribute to task performance. We predicted that the volatility of the input structure 268 may influence subjects' inference about the gaze and subsequent decision to take gaze 269 into account. The influence of probability (high vs. low) and volatility (stable vs. As predicted, low AQ scorers utilised the gaze schedule to successfully learn about 279 the card probabilities. While they showed superior performance in the task (see SI for 280 details), they also displayed significant differences in learning about the card 281
probabilities as a function of the gaze schedule. A significant group × condition interaction was observed for parameter ߢ (group: df= (1, 35) , F=0.28, p>0.60; 283 condition: df= (1, 35) , F=1.02, p>0.30; interaction: df= (1, 35) , F=10.74, p=0.0025), 284
suggesting that whereas high AQ scorers' learning about the card probabilities was 285 unaffected by the gaze congruency schedule, low AQ scorers adapted their learning 286 rate according to the gaze schedule ( Figure 3A ). This interaction effect was supported 287 by post-hoc t-tests, which revealed that low AQ participants showed larger ߢ values 288 in the incongruent compared to the congruent first condition (two-tailed t-test; df=16, 289 t=-2.55, p bonferroni =0.04 corrected for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni 290 correction), whereas low AQ scorers showed a lack of differences between the two 291 conditions (two-tailed t-test; df=16, t=2.08, p bonferroni = 0.10). This result was also 292 related to participants' post-experiment description of their performance. In contrast 293 to high AQ scorers who showed a lack of task differences, low scorers reported 294 having to rely on the gaze information more when the card and gaze input structures 295 started out as incongruent as compared to the congruent first condition (group: 296 df= (1, 35) , F=0.80, p>0.38; condition: df= (1, 35) , F=0.80, p>0.37; interaction: 297 df= (1, 35) , F=5.89, p=0.021) ( Figure S5A ). 298
Mirroring this effect, we also observed significant group × condition interactions for 299 the precision of the prediction about the card probabilities or ߨ ො ଶ, (௧) (see Eqn 5) . Low 300 AQ scorers were more confident in their predictions about the card probabilities when 301 the gaze schedule began as congruent than when it began as incongruent to the 302 winning cards as compared to the high AQ scorers (group: df= (1, 35) p=0.02). High AQ scorers showed no differences in belief precision across the two 305 gaze schedules ( Figure 3B ).
Association between AQ scores and the utility of misleading advice in a volatile 307
environment: Figure 4A illustrates the performance in each phase of the gaze 308 accuracy. As expected, we observed a significant relationship between AQ scores and 309 choosing in accordance with the gaze during volatile low probability phases 310 (R 2 =22.28%, F = 9.74, p = 0.0037), with AQ scores correlating with the number of 311 trials where the subjects took the gaze into account (r = 0.52, 95% CI = 0.29/0.75) 312 ( Fig. 4C ). Since there are no AQ group differences when the gaze cue is stable, the 313 results suggest that high AQ scorers do spontaneously take the social cue into 314 account, even when its meaning (i.e., gaze direction) is reversed, thereby implying 315 that lower level aspects of social processing are intact. The group difference emerges 316 when the gaze cue is volatile. In this context, the gaze cue is imprecise (i.e., less 317 reliable) and should be ignored, but high AQ scorers continue to rely on it leading to 318 poor performance in particular when the gaze cue accuracy is low. In terms of the 319 computational model, this implies that the high AQ scorers do not take account of the 320 precision of the gaze cue when using it to infer on the card probabilities. In this study we applied hierarchical Bayesian modeling to investigate autistic trait-327 related differences in the extent to which healthy individuals integrate and make use 328 of gaze cues in a probabilistic reward learning task. For optimal performance, our task 329 required following both the card and the gaze cues and to combine these two sources 330 of information, even though instructions provided very little information about the 331 nature and relevance of the gaze cues in contrast to other studies using explicit forms 332 of social advice (11, 14). As expected, our results demonstrate an inverse relationship 333 between autistic traits (as measured by AQ scores) and total task scores obtained by 334 study participants, such that individuals higher in autistic traits obtained lower total 335 task scores. 336
337
We were particularly interested to model perceptual as well as higher-order 338 processing of both card and gaze cues and, in particular, their relationship to action 339 selection, i.e. the extent to which individuals were actually biased by the social 340 information provided on a trial-by-trial basis. Results of our computational analyses 341 provide evidence for AQ-related group differences, such that individuals lower in AQ 342 scores are influenced by the gaze cue more as indicated by an enhanced learning rate 343 modulation as a function of the gaze schedule ( Figure 3A ). This unmasks a learning 344 deficit in high AQ scorers, namely the failure to take into account the social context in 345 order to adapt the learning about the non-social stimulus to accurately predict the 346 outcome of the binary lottery. Furthermore, our results indicate that individuals high 347 in AQ had particular difficulties integrating the social cue, as they were more likely to 348 rely on the gaze during volatile trials and when the gaze accuracy was low ( Figure S5 ). These results jointly suggest that autistic traits are associated with a reduced 350 impact of social information on the precision of higher-level prior beliefs, which has a 351 detrimental effect on probabilistic learning about card outcomes. 352
353
By providing these insights into AQ-related differences in social cognition, our study, 354 we believe, is most relevant to current discussions concerned with mechanistic 355 explanations of autistic symptomatology: Predictive coding theories have 356 reconstructed autism in terms of high-level attenuated precisions relative to sensory 357 precision (9), which results in an enhanced weighting of PEs (10) and a loss of the 358 selective force when processing a context with multiple cues (19). We find reduced 359 modulation of top-down belief precision as a function of social context ( Figure 3B) , 360 which is another mechanism leading to an enhanced weighting of PEs (9). As stated 361 by Pellicano and Burr (7), Bayesian models provide an important avenue, which can 362 help to identify whether autistic trait-associated alterations lie in the reliance on prior 363 knowledge or the optimal update of prior information during learning. In our 364
Bayesian formulation we addressed this issue by assessing possible relationships of 365 perceptual and response model parameters with AQ scores. We found a relationship 366 between perceptual model and response model parameters with AQ scores, although 367 the latter was less significant. Participants who scored higher on the AQ questionnaire 368 did not take advantage of the gaze schedule to adjust their belief precision about the 369 card outcomes. This finding relates to recent applications of hierarchical Bayesian 370 modelling in the context of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (20). Individuals with 371 ASD showed reduced learning rates and thus belief precision about probabilistic (non-372 social) outcomes while at the same time exhibiting an enhanced learning about volatility. While we observed a reduced modulation of the learning rate by the social 374 cue, we also found a lack of differences in learning about volatility, suggesting the 375 presence of similar but dampened learning deficits in individuals with subclinical 376 autistic traits. These findings appear consistent with a recent suggestion by Palmer et 377 al (21), who propose that autism may not impair the ability to process social 378 information per se, but rather lead to differences in how the relevant representations 379 are integrated for optimal action selection. 380
381
In light of other propositions, which hold that autistic trait-related impairments of 382 social cognition may be particularly relevant in complex and unpredictable situations 383 (19), we further investigated whether the subjects' AQ scores were also related to task 384 performance during phases of the experiment, which included volatile and misleading 385 gaze cues. Here, our data show that this particularly unstable environment made it 386 more difficult for subjects with higher AQ scores to use the social cue while making 387 decisions. This kind of influence of volatility on behavior parallels results from 388 previous studies, which report that an unpredictable context makes it more difficult 389 for autistic individuals to use social cues in an appropriate way (22). Our finding can, 390 therefore, be seen as evidence for difficulties of contextualizing social cues in light of 391 high uncertainty. 392
393
The modeling approach that we implemented here is a promising method for 394 capturing individual differences in the learning and integration of social information. 395
Given the heterogeneity of the population, this could be particularly useful for 396 identifying subgroups that may map onto distinct mechanisms of impaired social interaction in autism. The "Observing the observer" approach has, indeed, been 398 demonstrated to be useful for inference on hidden states and parameters that shape 399 inter-individual differences in learning (23). Our results indicate that Bayesian models 400 may be particularly powerful in providing mechanistic explanations of social 401 difficulties, which are particularly relevant to an understanding of psychiatric 402 disorders (4, 24, 25). Advances in computational psychiatry (26-29) and studies such 403 as this could, therefore, contribute to mechanistic formulations of psychopathology. 404
405
It is important to note that we cannot rule out intact precision-weighted PE processing 406 in patients with autism since our sample comprised healthy subjects. One can 407 speculate that in a patient sample impaired inference about the social cue in addition 408 to the reduced integration of social information could be observed. Therefore, future 409 research should include testing patients with a formal diagnosis of autism to explore 410 whether the observed differences hold across the entire autistic spectrum. 411 Furthermore, the experimental paradigm introduced here and our analysis approach 412 could be used together with neuroimaging to investigate which activity and 413 connectivity profiles in brain regions relevant for social cognition underlie the 414 observed autistic trait-related behavioral differences. 415 416 Taken together, the results of our study demonstrate autistic trait-related behavioral 417 differences in a task that requires the integration of non-social and social information. 418
Using hierarchical Bayesian modeling, we show that these performance differences 419 are subserved by impairments of integrating social information to infer on causal structures in the environment, which is consistent with previous findings in autism 421 (5) . 
515
ߢ and ߴ are estimated in logit-space, while the other parameters are estimated in log-space.
516
Whereas the prior variances for all parameters are set to be rather broad, we selected a 517 shrinkage prior mean for the decision noise such that behaviour is explained more by 518 variations in the rest of the parameters rather than decision noise. representing the coupling between the second and the third level for the card model, 540
showed a significant group*condition interaction. (B) ߨ ଶ, (௧) , the average belief 541 precision about the card probabilities also showed a significant group*frame 542
interaction The interaction suggests significant differences between the two 543 conditions in the low AQ group, which were absent in the high AQ group. See main 544 text for details. Jittered raw data are plotted for each variable. The red line refers to 545 the mean, the interrupted red line refers to the median, the coloured background 546 reflects the 95% confidence intervals for the mean, and the grey background refers to 547 1 standard deviation of the mean. ** refers to significant post-hoc t-tests after 548 bonferroni correction. 549 B.
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Probability Schedules for the Card and the Gaze
We have used one pair of cards consisting of one blue and one green card. The exact winning probabilities of the blue card, i.e. p(blue card = correct) were: 0.75 (trials 1-60); 0.20 (trials 61-80); 0.80 (trials 81-100); 0.20 (trials 101-120). We depict this reward schedule in Figure 1B . The exact probabilities of the green card to be predictive of a gain were given by: p(green card = correct) = 1-p(blue card = correct).
The exact probabilities of the gaze to be predictive of gain, i.e. p(advice = correct) were: 0.73 (trials 1-30); 0.20 (trials 31-40); 0.80 (trials 41-50); 0.20 (trials 51-60); 0.80 (trials 61-70); 0.16 (trials 71-120). This schedule is shown in Figure 1C . It was reversed for half of the subjects by making use of the following schedule: 0.27 (trials 1-30); 0.80 (trials 31-40); 0.20 (trials 41-50); 0.80 (trials 51-60); 0.20 (trials 61-70); 0.84 (trials 71-120). We obtained this by the subtraction: 1 -p(advice = correct). The reward magnitudes displayed on the cards were random to avoid subjects' associating numbers with the winning probabilities of the cards, i.e. if the numbers were not random there would be a bias towards choosing the card with the higher possible gain.
Hierarchical Gaussian Filter
The structure of the perceptual model is depicted in Figure 2 as a graphical model. 
States and represent the estimated precisions about (i) the sensory input from the level below (i.e., precision of the data -gaze or card) and (ii) the belief at the current level, respectively for the two information sources.
The belief updates about the gaze and card are given by: The precisions are given by Equations 1 and 2 in the main text.
Parameter Estimation
Maximum a posteriori estimates of the parameters were obtained using an approximate variational Bayesian scheme. The update equations take the form of precision-weighted prediction errors following a form similar to an extended Kalman Filter and are, hence, analytically tractable. Beliefs at every level in the hierarchy are updated with a step size equivalent to the prediction error times a ratio of precisions (precision of the data in the numerator and precision of the prediction in the denominator). For the details of the update equations and the variational Bayesian inversion scheme see (1, 2) .
All the parameters , , , , and the state variables were estimated for each subject by using a quasi-Newton minimization algorithm as implemented in HGF version 3 running on MATLAB R2018b (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA).
Model Space and Bayesian Model Selection
To contrast between competing mechanisms underlying decisions, our model space included a total of 2 2 2 models that assumed different mechanisms for integrating individual (probabilistic reward learning) and social learning ( Figure S1 ).
In addition to the "HGF" family, we included a "Normative" model family with fixed parameters paired with a decision noise, as suggested by reviewers. This model family assumes ideal Bayesian learning about the two information sources with participants only differing in terms of translating their beliefs into decisions.
Furthermore, we included two response model families, one which assumed integration of the two information sources -"Integrated: Gaze and Card", and another that assumed subjects did not take the gaze accuracy into account when making decisions, the "Reduced: Card" family. Finally, since participants were told that the points displayed on the cards were not related to the winning card probability but they reflected the reward magnitude given a correct decision, we also included two model families which assumed that subjects considered or did not consider the points displayed on the cards, with the addition of the "Reward" and "No Reward" families, 
Model Comparison
Bayesian model selection revealed that participants' responses were best explained by a hierarchical Bayesian model that assumed that participants predicted the outcome by arbitrating, i.e., combining the two information sources and weighing them by their relative precisions. Furthermore, the winning model suggested that the relative precision of each information source was modulated by individual differences in how much one relied on the advice, indicating that participants expressed a unique bias towards or against the social cue (protected exceedance probability = 0.996; Figure   S2 ), as previously found (4) .
When considering all models individually and separately for each group, the threelevel HGF with the "Integrated: Gaze and Card" response model ( best explained participants' choices. Finally, the response models, which assumed participants considered the reward information displayed onto the cards (i.e., M , M , M , M ) also outperformed models in which reward information was not considered ( Figure S3 ).
Model Validity
In addition to model comparison, we used multiple regression to evaluate how well the winning model explained participants' performance (percentage of correct responses and total number of points gained at the end of the task). We found that the perceptual and response MAP estimates extracted from the winning model (M ), i.e., , , , , and , jointly predicted participants' performance accuracy (R 2 = 41.80%, F = 3.47, p = 0.0104) and total score (R 2 = 53.75%, F = 5.62, p = 0.0006).
The model parameters also exhibited predictive validity, as they jointly predicted participants' debriefing questionnaire scores related to how much they used the gaze stimulus (scale from 0 to 100) when predicting the task outcomes (R 2 = 33.89%, F = 2.48, p = 0.046).
Behavioural Results
In contrast to high AQ scorers, low scorers utilised the gaze schedule to successfully learn about the card probabilities. First, they showed superior performance accuracy (group: df=(1,35) , F=6.65, p=0.01; condition: df=(1,35) , F=2.02, p=0.16;
interaction: df=(1,35) , F=0.13, p>0.70) ( Figure S4A ) and total amounts of points won at the end of the task (group: df=(1,35) (Figure S5D ).
AQ and Social Weighting
Concerning the hypothesis related to AQ and social weighting, we observed a significant group condition interaction for response model parameter : group:
df= (1, 35) , F=0.11, p>0.70; condition: df= (1,35) , F=1.33, p>0.25; interaction:
df= (1, 35) , F=4.50, p=0.04) ( Figure S6 ). However, neither the condition nor the group differences were supported by post-hoc t-tests (two-tailed t-test; df=16, t=-2.33, pbonferroni =0.06 and two-tailed t-test; df=16, t=0.68, pbonferroni =1.00). This suggested that the trend towards a larger and weighting of the gaze information ( Figure S5 ) in the congruent compared to the incongruent condition could be explained by the greater reliance on the gaze when it was not predictive of the winning card. Figure S1 : Hierarchical structure of the model space: The models considered in this study have a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial structure and can be displayed as a tree. The leaves at the bottom represent individual models of learning in which both social and non-social sources of information are considered. The nodes at the top level represent the perceptual model families (normative HGF, three-level HGF). For each of these model families, we considered 2 candidate response models, which represented different ways in which participants might combine social and/or non-social sources to make decisions. These were further divided into models that considered the reward displayed on the cards or not. The red line refers to the mean, the interrupted red line refers to the median, the coloured background reflects the 95% confidence intervals for the mean, and the grey background refers to 1 standard deviation of the mean. *p <0.05; **p<0.001.
FIGURES
Figure S5: Behaviour variables for both groups and conditions: (A)
Postexperiment debriefing questionnaire item referring to the extent to which participants considered the gaze during the task showed a significant group-by-condition interaction. The interaction suggests significant differences between the two conditions in the low AQ group, which were absent in the high AQ group. (B-D) Main effects of group were observed for several behavioural variables obtained from performing the task: (B) Reliance on gaze when it was incorrect -referring to how often participants relied on the gaze when it was incorrect. While there was a main effect of condition, participants in the high AQ group relied on instances of incorrect gaze more often than those in the low AQ group. Similar effects were detected for the frequency of relying on the gaze when it was volatile (C) and when it was volatile and incorrect (D). Jittered raw data are plotted for each variable. The red line refers to the mean, the interrupted red line refers to the median, the coloured background reflects the 95% confidence intervals for the mean, and the grey background refers to 1 standard deviation of the mean. *p <0.05; **p<0.001.
Figure S6: MAP estimates for both groups and conditions:
Response model parameter , the parameter representing the social bias showed a significant group-bycondition interaction. The interaction suggests significant differences between the two conditions in the high AQ group, which were absent in the low AQ group. Jittered raw data are plotted for each variable. The red line refers to the mean, the interrupted red line refers to the median, the coloured background reflects the 95% confidence intervals for the mean, and the grey background refers to 1 standard deviation of the mean. Post-hoc t-tests for this effect were not significant after Bonferroni correction.
